Background on the Maryland All-Payer Hospital Payment System

The Health Services Cost Review Commission (HSCRC) Background, Methods and Lessons Learned

Presentation for the Seminar on Information Systems and Performance Assessment of Public Hospitals

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Purpose of the Presentation

- 1) Describe the Maryland Hospital Payment System
- Provide an Overview of Diagnostic Related Grouping (DRG) – based Payment Systems
- Discuss how successful implementation of a wellstructured, data-driven <u>Provider Payment Mechanism</u> (PPM) can achieve multiple policy goals:
 - Cost-Containment
 - Quality Improvement
 - Financial Stability (Payment Adequacy)
 - Equity and Standardization
 - Improved Performance Monitoring (Accountability)
 - Enhanced Management Decision-making Autonomy

Structure of the Presentation

- 1) Major Health Care Problems in Maryland prior to Implementation of Payment Mechanism
- 2) Description of Maryland Hospital Provider Payment Mechanism (PPM)
- 3) Performance Results
- 4) Basics of DRG-based Payment
- 5) Relevancy for Sao Paulo Public Hospital System

Health Care Policy Issues and Problems in Maryland 1970s

State of Maryland





Health Care Issues in Maryland 1970s

- Hospitals accounted for high proportion of health costs (>50%)
- Pluralistic payer and provider industries (public/private)
- Large and inefficient public hospitals (city, county, state)
- Highly fragmented payment system
- Very high cost (25% above national average) and growing more rapidly
- Hospitals stratified by patients served and by services offered
 - "Poor" hospitals and "Rich" hospitals
- Absence of reliable information on performance (cost /quality)

Major Policy Problems


- Inconsistent payments and no clear financial incentives
- Overall high cost strain on government budgets
- Over and under supply of services
- Two-tiered system of medical care (Rich vs. Poor)
- Insufficient payment levels for hospitals treating uninsured
- Growing access problems
- Financial instability city hospitals on the verge of insolvency
- No consistent way of measuring performance (lack of metrics)

Creation of the Health Services Cost Review Commission (HSCRC)

Payment System Development

- HSCRC (government agency) Created in 1971 to address policy problems
- Legislation supported by the hospitals in the state
 - Needed a way to pay for care to the uninsured
 - Wanted a more financially stable system
 - Agreed to cost control
- HSCRC Two Key Powers:
 - Broad powers of data collection and disclosure
 - Broad powers to establish payment levels for hospitals
- 1971 1973: Development of Data Systems
- 1974: Set payment levels paid by Private Insurers
- 1977: Authorized to set payment levels for Public Insurers

Overview of Maryland Health Regulatory Agencies



Characteristics of the HSCRC

- 7 Commissioners appointed by Maryland Governor
- HSCRC politically and legally independent over time
- Very broad language in statute & regulation provides the Commission with flexibility to modify payment system
- Commission professional staff: currently 28 FTEs
- Regulate inpatient & outpatient hospital services for 47 acute care hospitals - \$13 billion revenue per year
- Strong emphasis on data collection
- Use of financial incentives (payment) to change behavior and achieve goals
- Extensive use of measurement and monitoring tools ¹²


HSCRC Law and Policy Goals

- Legislature did not prescribe payment methods
- Enabling statute articulated <u>broad guidelines</u> for the approach and overall policy goals of the Commission:
 - 1. Cost Containment
 - 2. System for funding care to the uninsured (Access)
 - 3. Equity in terms of the final rates established and fairness in the methodologies
 - 4. Public disclosure/Accountability (monitoring)
 - 5. Financial Stability and Management Autonomy
 - 6. Effective hospital operation (Quality of care)
- HSCRC has largely fulfilled these key policy goals
- Context and Performance Results follow

Performance Results 1977- 2010

- Cost Containment
- Access to Care
- Equity and Fairness
- Accountability and Monitoring
- Financial Stability
- Quality of Care

Snap Shot: Health Care Industry in Maryland 2010




Cost and Efficiency Goals - Context

- Efficiency in Funding <u>Macro</u> (Health System Level)
- Efficiency in Production <u>Micro</u> (hospital level)
- <u>Allocation</u> Efficiencies (allocation of resources and availability of services)
- Mechanism to promote <u>autonomy</u> in decision making by managers to evolve, respond and innovate
- All accomplished through the HSCRC's Provider Payment Mechanism

Cost Containment Success in Maryland

- 2nd Lowest Rate of Cost Growth of any State 1976-2007
 - 1976: Maryland Cost per case was 25% ABOVE the US average
 - 2007: Maryland Hospital cost per case 2% BELOW the US average
 - 2010: Maryland projected to be 4% below the US average
 - Estimated \$40 billion savings to the State over the period 1976-2007



Growth in Hospital Costs per case (MD vs. US)

• Had the US grown at the slower Maryland rate of growth - hospital spending would have been \$1.8 trillion lower

Access Goals - Context

- Policy Failure in US <u>absence of universal insurance</u>
- Maryland needed for a mechanism to pay for care to uninsured patients
- Stratification of hospitals "poor" and "rich" results in two-tiered Medicare Care
- Public and City hospitals suffered from underfunding
- Need for equitable sharing of these costs across public and private insurers

HSCRC Mechanisms to Promote Access

- HSCRC developed a unique mechanism for financing hospital "uncompensated care" (UC)
- Hospital payments levels contain an extra provision ("markup") to fund care to the uninsured
- Example: Cost per day = \$1,000; UC 8% markup; hospital price set at \$1,080 per bed day charged to all payers
- Results:
 - Maryland has the best access to hospital care in the US
 - Hospitals receive funding for \$1 billion/year for care to the uninsured
 - This "mark-up" is in the rates applied to All-Payers, so all payers contribute equitably to the funding of this care
 - There is no "Patient-Dumping" from private to public hospitals
 - Public and Private facilities receive this extra payment

Equity and Fairness - Context

- In the US different payers pay different amounts for the same hospital service
- Large amount of "cost-shifting" from payer to payer
 - Public payers "pay lowest levels" and raise their prices to Private insurers
 - Uninsured patients are charged the highest amounts
- Very unfair payment system in the rest of the USA
- Contributes to inability to control costs
- Also "cross-subsidization" of services
 - Obstetrics low charges and lose money
 - Cardiac Surgery very high charges and highly profitable
- Results in over- and undersupply of services

Equity, Fairness and Standardization Goals

- Maryland has the most Equitable Payment system in US
- Payment level for a given service at a given hospital is the same for every payer (insurer)
- No "preferential arrangements" to any one insurer and no "cost-shifting" allowed
- All payers pay their fair share of hospital costs
- Equity also means "fairness" in methodologies for payment
 - Necessary adjustments to payment (outliers; different labor costs)
- Lastly there is an emphasis on uniform standards in reporting and comparative analysis across hospitals


Accountability/Monitoring Goals - Context

- Data are needed to establish the payment system
- These data must be accurate, available and timely
- Success of a payment system depends on payment incentives used
- Incentives must be clear and understandable
- Also the public also has the right to hold hospitals accountable for their performance
- Government uses comparative measurement (metrics) to identify best and worst performing hospitals

Accountability & Monitoring in Maryland

- Maryland has the best data on hospital performance in US
- All data are publicly available (cost data, patient data, prices, financial statements, quality data)
- All Commission discussion done in public meetings
- Many Reports and Analysis on Hospital Performance (Cost, Access, Quality, and Meeting Community needs)
 - Overall Cost Performance vs. the Nation
 - Ranking of hospitals on Relative Efficiency
 - Uncompensated Care levels by hospital
 - Report on the level of Community Benefits provided by hospitals
 - Annual Hospital Financial Condition report
 - Annual ranking of hospitals on HSCRC Quality measures
- Hospital and Payer Performance Report (example)
 - Focus development of a "<u>Value Index</u>" for Maryland Hospitals

HSCRC Value Index



Adequate Payment/Financial Stability - Context

- Hospitals should be given payments that provide them with sufficient revenues to efficient operating costs
- Sufficient payments help avoid unintended behaviors
 - Risk Selection (avoiding the sickest patients)
 - Skimping on Quality
 - Informal payments
- Predictable revenues allow hospitals to manage their costs better
- Focus of policy should be on "cost control" not profit control"
- Clear financial incentives promote desired behaviors

Financial Stability in Maryland

- Focus on Payment adequacy: Set payments in proportion to cost
- Payments set "in advance"; allows for better budgeting
- Uncompensated care "paid for" in the rates
- Maryland has the highest "bond credit ratings" of any state
- Our experience: Hospitals manage their expenses to in response to changes in their revenues (payment levels)
- Overall operating margins (regulated and unregulated operations)
 = 2.75% (*slightly below US profit levels*)
- Result: high degree of predictability & financial stability in the system – for <u>both Public and Private hospitals</u>
- "Public" hospitals operate independently/autonomously

Operating Effectiveness and Quality - Context

- Hospitals have dual goals of improving efficiency and effectiveness in operation (Quality)
- Payment incentives can be established to promote Quality
- Not much progress in US on measuring Quality until now
- Now a focus on linking "Outcomes" to payment
- Need to eliminate current incentives that reward poor quality or pay hospitals for adverse events
- Linking of efficiency and effectiveness = "Overall Value"₂₇

HSCRC Efforts to Promote Quality

- HSCRC has statutory mandate to promote Effective Operation
- HSCRC: Uniquely position to lead the nation in Hospital Quality
 - Comprehensive payment system (link to quality measures)
 - Most sophisticated Risk Adjustment system
 - Most extensive administrative data in the country (Quality measures)

• HSCRC now leading the nation in linking Payment to Quality

- Evidence based process of care measure
- Hospital Complication Rates
- Development of a Method to reduce Preventable Hospital Readmissions
- Also a "Cost" component to improving Quality

HSCRC Quality Initiatives

- Value Based Purchasing (VBP)
 - Monitoring hospitals use of Effective "Evidence-based Processes of Care" in 4 clinical categories (heart failure; heart attack; pneumonia; SIP)
 - Implemented in 2008
 - Linked to payment (hospitals at-risk for \$65 million each year)
- Comparing Hospital Complication Rates & Link to Payment
 - Methodology compares actual number of complications vs. "expected" number
 - Extensive exclusion logic and risk-adjusted for a fair comparisons
 - Very broad initiative looking at 50 different complication categories
 - Expected to reduce hospital costs by as much as \$500 million per year in Maryland
- Reducing Readmission Rates by linking to Payment
 - Methodology largely completed
 - Expected implementation July, 2010
 - Estimated system savings from reducing unnecessary readmissions > \$800 mill/.year
- Also Development of HSCRC Value Index

Hospital Acquired Complications being Monitored

Extreme Complications

- Extreme CNS Complications
- Acute Pulmonary Edema & Respiratory Failure w Ventilation
- Shock
- Ventricular Fibrillation, Cardiac Arrest
- Renal Failure with Dialysis
- Post-Operative Respiratory Failure w Tracheostomy

Cardiovascular-Respiratory Complications

- Stroke & Intracranial Hemorrhage
- Pneumonia, Lung Infection
- Aspiration Pneumonia
- Pulmonary Embolism
- Congestive Heart Failure
- Acute Myocardial Infarct
- Peripheral Vascular Complications Except VT
- Venous Thrombosis

Gastrointestinal Complications

- Major GI Complications w Transfusion or Signif Bleeding
- Major Liver Complications

Infectious Complications

- Clostridium Difficile Colitis
- Urinary Track Infection
- Septicemia & Severe Infection

Perioperative Complications

- Post-Op Wound Infection & Deep Wound Disruption w Procedure
- Reopening of Surgical Site
- Post-Op Hemorrhage & Hematoma w Hemorrhage Control Proc or I&D Proc
- Accidental Puncture/Laceration During Invasive
 Procedure
- Post-Op Foreign Body

Malfunctions, Reactions Etc.

- latrogenic Pneumothrax
- Mechanical Complication of Device, Implant & Graft
- Inflammation, & Other Complications of Devices, Implants or Grafts Except Vascular Infection
- Infections due to Central Venous Catheters

Obstetrical Complications

- Obstetrical Hemorrhage w Transfusion
- Obstetrical Laceration & Other Trauma w/o
 Instrumentation
- Obstetrical Laceration & Other Trauma w Instrumentation
- Major Puerperal Infection and Other Major Obstetrical Complications

Other Medical and Surgical Complications

- Post-Hemorrhagic & Other Acute Anemia w Transfusion
- Decubitus Ulcer
- Encephalopathy


HSCRC's Provider Payment Mechanism/Monitoring Tool:

Diagnostic Related Groups (DRGs) and Case-Based Payment Systems

Payment System Development

- Choice what Payment System to use depends on major Policy Goals
- Different Payment Systems: Line Item; Per Diems; Per Case; Episode payment; Global Payment (capitation)
- Each system has advantages/disadvantages
- Each has different financial risk implications for hospitals and payers (performance risk/insurance risk)
- Maryland uses a DRG based system


Financial Risk of Different Payment Structures



Per Case Payment

- Relies on relating the Cost per patient to a specific category (product definition) for each case
- The cost (on average) for all Open Heart Surgery Cases of a given severity level = \$25,000
- Hospital then is paid for its performance "on average"
- Cases performed vary above and below the average
- So hospital assumes some financial risk
- But overall risk assumed is reasonable and hospitals should be at some risk to provide efficient care

Hospitals Usually Paid DRG-Specific Fixed Price



History and Use of DRGs

- Developed in US in early 1970s
- Maryland System first to use DRGs for Reimbursement - 1976
- Used in other State-Based All-Payer Hospital Payment Systems
- Adopted by the US Medicare Program (Inpatient Prospective Payment System (IPPS) in 1983
- Used around the world in OECD and Middle Income countries as a clinical classification and payment system

DRGs: Fundamental Incentive System

- DRGs: Can be a fundamental building block of any Health System
- Categorical model for defining the "types of cases" or the products of hospital care
- DRG categories can be linked to payment values
- DRG Systems not just a <u>Provider Payment</u> <u>Mechanism</u> - they are a valuable <u>incentive system</u> that can help achieve Primary Health Policy Goals
- Success of any incentive system depends on how clearly targets/goals can be communicated

DRGs: A Product Definition, Measurement and Communication Tool

- DRGs also have very important "Communication" benefits clinical description of each "type" of case
- Clinical Categories that define the products of hospital care
- Communication/Categorical nature of DRGs also a powerful management tool (in discussing/monitoring care)
- Provide a metric for measuring relative efficiency and quality


DRG Characteristics

- Medically/Clinically meaningful categories
- Similar expected amount and type of resource use for patients in each DRG
- Based on routinely available data (cost data and patient data)
- Manageable number of groups
- Embodies cost and clinical data into a single clinical category (Product of Care)

Requirements to Develop

- Cost accounting system that allows costs (direct and indirect) to be assigned to patients
- Medical record information (clinical and demographic) on each patient to assign DRGs
- Ability to link cost data on each patient to the patient information and the patient's DRG category
- Establishment of Base DRG Payment (payment for the average case)
- Development of "relative weights" (payment levels for each DRG)

DRGs and Cost Accounting



Cost accounting System must be able to assign costs (direct & indirect) to each patient

Strengths of DRGs

- Better way to categorize and measure care and cost
- Provides standardized definitions and language
- Helps control cost per case resulting in shorter stays and less ancillary use per case (more efficient inputs)
- Also improves overall health system efficiency
 - May reduce overall hospital expenditures
 - Help to reduce over utilization and excess capacity
- Will help reduce cost variations across providers
- Provides a clear incentive for hospitals (key to DRG's success)

Strengths of DRGs

- Basis for increasing hospital management autonomy provide more flexibility of decision-making to respond to DRG-based incentives
- Better allocation of revenues and resources if DRG payment levels accurately reflect cost per case
- Basis for measuring Quality of Care (data collected provide useful data)
- Metric for comparing relative efficiency and quality
- Can lead to expanded "bundles of care" (i.e., Admission/Readmission; or Hospital/Physician)

DRG Payment System Weaknesses

- <u>Heavily reliant on timely and accurate data</u> and standardized and accurate coding procedures
- Requires improved managerial and analytic capabilities
- Will encounter problems if DRG payment levels do not reflect costs per patient
- Controls cost per case, but number of cases
- Potential for <u>quality skimping</u> if payment set too low i.e., don't cover long run marginal costs
- Need for <u>frequent re-establishment</u> of payment levels every 1-2 years to reflect changes in medical practice

Conclusions

- DRG systems are both an incentive tool and a communication/evaluation tool
- Success of DRGs related to the importance of having a clear definition of the product
- DRG per case systems place hospitals at some financial risk (moderate risk) for improved efficiency
- Success of DRG systems dependent on cost data and ability to set payment levels to match cost per case
- The use of DRGs continues to evolve
 - Quality area
 - More expanded bundled payment

Key Principles and Lessons from the Maryland Experience

Key Success Factors of HSCRC System

- 1. Financial incentives drive hospital behavior
- 2. Establishing appropriate incentives can help achieve major policy goals and increase managerial autonomy
- 3. Prospective systems establish prices in advance provide clear targets and lead to better budgeting
- 4. Per case systems place hospitals under moderate financial risk to improve efficiency
- 5. Payment levels must be set to reflect the cost of care (adequate and proportional to cost)
- 6. Categorical models (DRGs) can add to this clarity of financial incentives and provide a good measurement tool₇

Key Success Factors (continued)

- 7. Equity in establishing payment levels is important to avoid "cost-shifting" and risk-avoiding behaviors
- 8. Adjustments to payment levels should be made to account for factors beyond a hospital's control
 - Outlier cases (extremely costly cases)
 - Differences in area wage levels
 - Other cost differences (medical education, high % poor patients)
- 9. System should be a "cost-control system not a "profit-control" system (profits are rewards to management for efficiency)
- 10. Accountability, Monitoring and Evaluation identify the best and worst performers
- 11. Payment systems should be modified over time to help improve quality of care and expanded coordination of care

Maryland Relevancy for US Reform

- USA Congress on the verge of passing major health reform legislation now
- Focuses only on Access (insurance) expansion
- Will reduce number of uninsured from 48 to 15 million
- Represents a substantial improvement to US health system if enacted
- No cost-control mechanisms considered
- Access and Cost are linked (must control cost)
- Maryland is the most enduring cost control system in the USA over the past 35 years

Recent National Recognition/Discussion of Maryland During Health Reform Debate

- Stuart Altman testimony: **Senate Finance** discussing the Maryland All-Payer Model (July 09)
- **RAND study** for Massachusetts recommending "All-Payer" rate setting and bundled payment as most effective cost containment approach (Aug. 2009)
- Presentations/Discussions of Uwe Reinhardt/Paul Ginsburg in national forums (Health Affairs/New York Times – Aug. 2009)
- Wall Street Journal article on the HSCRC (Sept. 2009)
- Health Affairs Article on successes of the Maryland System (Sept. 2009)
- Other articles in **New England Journal of Medicine Health Affairs** on the success of All-Payer systems (Summer 2009)
- **Business Week** article on "cost-shifting" discussing Maryland (Oct. 2009)
- Washington Post Editorial on Success of the HSCRC (Oct. 2009)
- Paul Ginsburg testimony before MedPac on Market Concentration of Hospitals; implications for cost containment and All-Payer Rate Regulation (Oct. 2009)
- **Commonwealth Foundation** article on success of Maryland (Nov. 2009)
- ABC News story on hospital Cost-Shifting, price variation nationally vs. situation in Maryland

Tudo Bem!

Muito Obrigado

Go Brazil in 2016!!!